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PARTIES
The caption of this case in the Utah Court of Appeals shows
the names of all parties to the proceeding in the court below.
Defendant
improperly

and

pleaded

appellee
as

Salt

Salt

Lake

Lake

plaintiff's original complaint.

City

Corporation

International

Airport

was
in

Salt Lake City Corporation owns

and operates the Salt Lake International Airport, so no additional
party is involved.

Salt Lake City Corporation is the actual party

defendant in interest in this action.

1

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PARTIES

i

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

DETERMINATIVE LAWS

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

Nature of the Case

3

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below

3

Relief Sought on Appeal

4

STATEMENT OF FACTS

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

5

ARGUMENT

7

POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT RULED CORRECTLY THAT IT LACKED
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER PLAINTIFF'S
CLAIM BECAUSE THE COMPLAINT WAS FILED OUTSIDE
THE TIME LIMIT OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY ACT

7

POINT II.
THE FIRST NOTICE OF CLAIM WAS PROPERLY FILED
AND SERVED
CONCLUSION

12
15

•

t

11

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases Cited
Bischel v. Merritt. 278 U.A.R. 29 (Utah App. 1995)
Brittain v. State. 882 P.2d 666 (Utah App. 1994)

12
1

Lamarr v. Utah State Dept. of Transportation.
828 P. 2d 535 (Utah 1992)

13

Ma lone v. Parker. 826 P. 2d 132 (Utah 1992)

11

Mvers v. McDonald. 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981)

9

O'Neal v. Division of Family Servs.. 821 P.2d 1139
(Utah 1991)
Scarborough v. Granite School Dist.. 531 P.2d 480
(Utah 1975)
Warren v. Provo City Corp.. 838 P.2d 1125
(Utah 1992)

9
7
7, 9, 10

Yearslev v. Jensen. 798 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990)

8

Statutes and other Authorities Cited
Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-501(2)

4

Utah Code Ann. 78-14-16 (1991)

11

Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-1 (1991)

11

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (1993)
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(1)

2, 7, 12
9

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12

12, 13

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1993)

2, 4, 7, 13

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-14 (1993)

3, 7, 12

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-15 (1993)

3, 7, 12

Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1995)

1

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4(e)(6)

12

iii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2) (k) (Supp. 1995).

This case

involves an appeal from a final judgment which was poured-over to
the Court of Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court on January 19, 1996.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
because plaintiff's complaint was filed outside the time limit of
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act following plaintiff's notice of
claim, where plaintiff filed a second notice of claim and attempted
to file suit within the limit measured from the second notice of
claim.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This case presents a question involving interpretation of a
portion of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act which imposes a
notice requirement on claimants as a prerequisite to filing suit
against a government entity.

"The trial court's interpretation of

a statute is a legal conclusion which
review[s] for correctness."

[the appellate court]

Brittain v. State. 882 P.2d 666, 668

(Utah App. 1994).
DETERMINATIVE LAWS
The interpretation of the following subsections of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act is pertinent to the resolution of the
issues in this appeal:

Utah Code Ann. S 63-30-11 (1993)
(2) Any person having a claim for injury
against a governmental entity, or against an
employee for an act or omission occurring
during the performance of his duties, within
the scope of employment, or under color of
authority shall file a written notice of claim
with the entity before maintaining an action,
regardless of whether or not the function
giving rise to the claim is characterized as
governmental.
(3)(a)
forth:

the notice of claim shall set
(i)

a brief

statement

of the

facts;
(ii)
asserted; and

the

nature

of

the

claim

(iii) the damages incurred by the
claimant so far as they are known.
(b) The notice of the claim shall be:
(i) signed by the person making
the claim or that person's agent, attorney,
parent, or legal guardian; and
(ii) directed and delivered to
the responsible governmental entity according
to the requirements of Section 63-30-12 or 6330-13.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1993)
A claim against a political subdivision,
or its employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance of his duties,
within the scope of employment, or under color
of authority, is barred unless notice of claim
is filed with the governing body of the
political subdivision within one year after
the claim arises, or before the expiration of
any extension of time granted under Section
63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the
function giving rise to the claim is
characterized as governmental.
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Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-14 (1993)
Within ninety days after filing a claim
the governmental entity or its insurance
carrier shall act thereon and notify the
claimant in writing of its approval or denial.
A claim shall be deemed to have been denied if
at the end of the ninety-day period the
governmental entity or its insurance carrier
has failed to approve or deny the claim.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-15 (1993)
(1) If the claim is denied, a claimant
may institute an action in the district court
against the governmental entity or an employee
of the entity.
(2) the claimant shall begin the action
within one year after denial of the claim or
within one year after the denial period specified in this chapter has expired, regardless
of whether or not the function giving rise to
the claim is characterized as governmental.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case arose out of injuries alleged by plaintiff/appellant
Tyrone Busch on a moving walkway at the Salt Lake International
Airport on April 20, 1993.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
Busch delivered notice of claim to Salt Lake City Corporation
on August 9, 1993.
notice of claim.

On April 19, 1994, Busch delivered a second
The complaint was filed in the Third Judicial

District Court on March 30, 1995.
The trial court, Hon. Anne M.

Stirba, entered

its order

dismissing the complaint on the ground that it was untimely, having
been filed more than one year and ninety days after the notice of
claim of August 9, 1993.

This appeal followed.

Relief Sought on Appeal
Salt Lake City Corporation requests this Court to affirm the
Order of Dismissal in its favor entered by the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following material facts were set forth in the memoranda
filed by the parties in the trial court pursuant to Rule 4-501(2) ,
Code of Judicial Administration, and are undisputed:
1.

On August 9, 1993, Tyrone Busch served on Salt Lake City

Corporation the written notice of claim required under the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13, alleging that
he was injured on a moving walkway at the Salt Lake International
Airport on April 20, 1993 (R. 10-11, 16-18, 85-100).
2.

On April 19, 1994, Busch sent a second written notice of

claim to Salt Lake City Corporation (R. 26, 101-105).
3.

On or about March 30, 1995, Busch filed the instant

action in Third District Court naming as defendant: "Salt Lake
International Airport, a Government Agency, doing business in Salt
Lake City, Utah."

A summons was served on Airport Director Lewis

Miller on April 5, 1995 (R. 1-7, 11).
4.

Salt Lake City Corporation owns and operates the Salt

Lake International Airport as a division or department of Salt Lake
City government.

The Airport is not subject to suit in its own

name apart from Salt Lake City Corporation (R. 11, 19-22) .
The following undisputed facts are established in the trial
court record:
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5.

Salt Lake City Corporation filed a motion to dismiss the

complaint on April 25, 1995, asserting that the court lacked
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action because Busch
failed to file his action within the time required under the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act. A second ground for dismissal was that
Busch improperly named as defendant Salt Lake City International
Airport rather than Salt Lake City Corporation (R. 8-9).
6.

Busch filed a motion to amend the complaint (R. 23) and

submitted a proposed amended complaint correctly identifying the
defendant as Salt Lake City Corporation (R. 35-39).

However, the

material facts of the date of the accident and the date of filing
the first notice of claim are not altered in the proposed amended
complaint.
7.

Salt Lake City pointed out in the trial court that

plaintiff's motion to amend complaint was futile because the
proposed amended complaint would be subject to dismissal on the
same ground as the original complaint, for failure to file within
one year and ninety days after filing the first notice of claim (R.
49) .
8.

After briefing and oral argument, the trial court ruled

that the complaint was untimely.
dismiss was granted.

Accordingly, the motion to

The motion to amend was denied (R. 66-68).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The complaint was filed more than one year after the denial
period had expired following the written notice of claim required
under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Busch points out that a
5

second notice of claim was filed, and his complaint was filed
within one year and ninety days after the second notice of claim.
However, the time for filing suit began to run from the date of the
first notice of claim.

Limitation periods begin to run upon the

happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of
action. Upon filing the first notice of claim# the statutory time
within which the complaint must be filed, began to run.

It would

not be fair or reasonable to allow Busch to benefit from filing a
second notice of claim, with the result of tolling the limitation
time between the filing of the first notice and the filing of the
second notice.
Busch asserts that his counsel at the time of the second
notice of claim was unable to verify that the first notice of claim
filed by prior counsel was done properly.

Therefore, Busch argues

he should be excused from the operation of the first notice of
claim.

However, there is no question but that the first notice of

claim was effective.

If Busch's successor counsel had any doubt,

the proper course of action would have been to file a complaint
within the time limit after the first notice of claim.

Salt Lake

City was not a party to any of the alleged communication problems
occasioned by Busch's employment of successive counsel. Salt Lake
City is entitled to the protection of the statute as it is written,
which required suit within one year and ninety days after notice of
claim is filed.

Busch's complaint filed after that time limit

lacked jurisdiction under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT RULED CORRECTLY THAT IT LACKED SUBJECT
MATTER JURISDICTION OVER PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM BECAUSE THE
COMPLAINT WAS FILED OUTSIDE THE TIME LIMIT OF THE UTAH
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT.
Busch alleges that he was injured on April 20, 1993. He filed
the written notice of claim required under Utah Code ann. § 63-soil and 13 by serving it on August 9, 1993.
If at the end of ninety days after filing of a claim, the
governmental entity has failed to approve or deny the claim, the
claim shall be deemed to have been denied. Utah Code Ann. § 63-3014.

A claimant must begin a civil action within one year after

denial of the claim or within one year after the denial period has
expired.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-15.

There is no evidence that this notice of claim was ever
approved.

If it was deemed to have been denied at the end of the

ninety-day approval period, Busch's complaint was required to have
been filed within one year after the end of the ninety-day approval
period, or by approximately November 7, 1994.

The complaint was

not filed until March 30, 1995, five months later.
Full compliance with the notice of claim requirement is a
jurisdictional requisite to the right to maintain a civil action
against a governmental entity.

Scarborough v. Granite School

Dist.. 531 P.2d 480, 484 (Utah 1975); Warren v. Provo City Corp.,
838 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1992) (claim against Provo city for operation
of Provo City Airport barred for failure to file timely notice of

7

claim); Yearslev v. Jensen. 798 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990) (variance
from statutory requirements was not allowed).
The filing of a second unnecessary notice of claim on August
14, 1994, does not alter the time limits under the first notice of
claim.
Busch points out that his counsel filed a second notice of
claim on April 14, 1994, and his complaint was filed within one
year and ninety days after the second notice of claim.
This argument ignores established rules that the general law
dealing with statutes of limitations applies to notices of claim
under the Act, and a cause of action accrues and the relevant
statute of limitations begins to run upon the happening of the last
event necessary to complete the cause of action. The Governmental
Immunity Act provides for two statutes of limitation:

First, a

claim must be filed within one year. Second, the claimant then has
one year after denial or the end of the denial period within which
to begin an action in district court.

With respect to the second

statute of limitations, the "last event necessary" is the filing of
the notice of claim.

Having filed the first notice of claim

through his own counsel, Busch cannot later ague that the notice
should not have been given legal effect. When the first notice was
filed

(and

deemed

denied

ninety

days

later),

the

one-year

limitation for filing a complaint began to run. Essentially, Busch
argues that by filing a second notice of claim, he should be
allowed unilaterally and retrospectively to toll the limitation
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time between the filing of the first notice and the filing of the
second notice.
Busch argues that he knows of no law which bars him from
filing multiple claims within the statutory time limits. This may
be true, but it is a much different matter to argue that the Court
should overlook the running of a statute of limitation simply
because Busch has filed a second, redundant, and unnecessary notice
of claim.
General analysis relating to statutes of

limitations is

appropriate to the filing of a notice of claim and the subsequent
filing of suit.

For example, § 63-30-11(1) states that a claim

arises when the statute of limitations that would apply in a
private party action begins to run.

Thus, the statute itself

refers to statutes of limitations when explaining the provisions of
the Act. Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has applied general law
dealing with statutes of limitations to notices of claim under the
Act.

O'Neal v. Division of Family Servs. . 821 P.2d 1139, 1141

(Utah 1991).

More recently the court stated that the notice of

claim provisions in the Act "operate as a one-year statute of
limitations in cases brought against" the government.

Warren v.

Provo Citv Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1128 (Utah 1992).
Relating to statutes of limitations, Utah law provides that "a
cause of action accrues and the relevant statute of limitations
begins to run *upon the happening of the last event necessary to
complete the cause of action . . . .,lf

Id. at 1128-29, citing

Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981).
9

The Governmental

Immunity Act

is somewhat unique because

it provides

for two

statutes of limitations. First, a claim against the government is
barred unless the claimant files a notice of claim within one year.
Second, the claimant then has one year from the government's denial
to begin the action in district court.

Thus, with the "first"

statute of limitations (in which claimant has to file a notice of
claim), the "last event necessary" is the accident giving rise to
the claim in the first place.

However, with respect to the

"second" statute of limitations (in which claimant has to file suit
after the denial of a claim) , the "last event necessary" is the
filing of the notice of claim.

See Warren. 838 P.2d at 1128

(notice of claim provisions operate "as a one-year statute of
limitations").
When Busch was injured on April 20, 1993 he had one year from
that date to file a notice of claim. His first notice of claim was
filed on August 9, 1993 in a timely manner.

Busch then had one

year and ninety days from that filing to bring suit because filing
his (first) notice of claim was the "last event necessary" to
accrue the cause of action.

When he filed his first notice of

claim, the one year statute of limitations referred to in Warren
started

running, and expired

approximately

November

7, 1994.

Plaintiff's complaint dated March 30, 1995, was five months outside
the statute of limitation.
Like the Governmental Immunity Act, the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act contains a filing requirement that acts as a
compulsory condition precedent that must be satisfied before a
10

plaintiff can bring an action.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-14-1 to 78-

14-16 (1991); Malone v. Parker, 826 P.2d 132f 133 (Utah 1992). The
Malpractice Act requires that to bring an action, a prospective
plaintiff in a medical malpractice suit must serve a notice of
intent to commence an action on a prospective defendant at least
ninety days before the plaintiff brings the suit.
limitations is two years.

The statute of

A plaintiff also must file a request

with the Department of Business Regulation for a prelitigation
hearing.

Although this panel review hearing is nonbinding, it is

a "compulsory condition precedent to initiating litigation."

Id.

Although not directly on point, Malone provides a useful
analogy because it demonstrates that statutes of limitations will
not be tolled by prelitigation filings. Plaintiff argued that her
multiple requests for a prelitigation panel review tolled the
statute.

The trial court granted defendant7s motion for summary

judgment based on a determination that the action was not timely.
Id. at 134. Affirming, the supreme court stated that Malone failed
to act timely in filing for an extension of the time in which the
panel would retain jurisdiction over her claim.

Because her claim

was defective, the statute of limitations did not toll.

Id. at

135. By analogy, filing a second notice of claim is not sufficient
to alter the one-year statute of limitations that began running
when Busch filed his first notice of claim.
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POINT II.
THE FIRST NOTICE OF CLAIM WAS PROPERLY FILED AND SERVED.
Busch apparently contends that the first notice of claim may
have been defective, and therefore the time limits should run from
his second notice of claim.
question

on the record

However, there is absolutely no

that the

first

notice

of

claim was

sufficient.
The record is clear that the first notice of claim complied
with the statutory requirements of § 63-3 0-11 (R. 85-87). Further,
the first notice of claim was served properly. The record contains
the constable's proof of service on the Salt Lake City Recorder (R.
88) and on the Salt Lake City Attorney (R. 96) and on Salt Lake
City Corporation by serving Ken Cowley, City Recorder (R. 100).
In Bischel v. Merritt. 278 U.A.R. 29 (Utah App. 1995), this
court held that filing a notice of claim with Salt Lake County was
accomplished by service of the notice of claim on a responsible
person in the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office.

Further, the

City Recorder is the person specified to receive personal service
of process under Rule 4(e)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Busch argues that the August 9, 1993, notice of claim was not
effective to commence the time period within which suit must be
filed (one year beyond the ninety-day denial period, U.C.A. § 6330-14 and 15) because that notice of claim was not filed with both
the Attorney General and the agency concerned as required by
§ 63-30-12.
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However, § 63-30-12 and the requirements therein apply only to
claims against the State or its employees.

Claims against Salt

Lake City Corporation as a municipal corporation are governed by
the separate and different requirement of § 63-30-13 pertaining to
claims against a political subdivision or its employees.

Under §

63-30-13, notice of claim must be filed "with the governing body of
the political subdivision."

Once that was accomplished on August

9, 1993, filing of the notice of claim was complete and the denial
period began to run.
There

is

no

requirement

that

claims

against

political

subdivisions such as Salt Lake City Corporation be filed with more
than one office, nor that such claims be filed with the State
Attorney General's office.

In fact, there would be no sense in

pursuing a claim against a city by filing a notice of claim with
the State Attorney General.
Therefore, Busch's reliance on Lamarr v. Utah State Dept. of
Transportation. 828 P.2d 535 (Utah 1992) is misplaced.

That case

involved a claim against a State agency under § 63-30-12. Filing
the notice of claim against the Attorney General and the agency
concerned was required under the terms of that section.

However,

the Lamarr case did not involve the requirements of § 63-3 0-13
pertaining to filing of notice of claim against a political
subdivision which would apply in the instant case. Section 63-3013, which applies in the instant case, does not require filing of
notice of claim on more than one entity.
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Filing is complete when

the notice of claim is filed with the governing body of the
political subdivision.
Lamarr sued both the Utah State Department of Transportation
and Salt Lake City, 828 P.2d at 536. Summary judgment for the City
was affirmed on substantive grounds which did not involve the
notice of claim, 828 P.2d at 540.

The requirement to file notice

of claim on the Attorney General and the agency concerned is
discussed in the Court of Appeals opinion only with respect to the
State agency, and not with respect to Salt Lake City.
Busch points to confusion arising from the transfer of his
file from previous counsel to present counsel. Yet Busch fails to
demonstrate that any such confusion could not have been avoided by
the simple solution of a telephone call or letter to clarify
matters

between previous

counsel

and new

counsel.

This is

especially true where the grounds for possible confusion were
minimal. The file from previous counsel did in fact show proof of
service of notice of claim on Salt Lake City Corporation. Further,
no such confusion was caused by or attributable to Salt Lake City
Corporation so its rights under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
remain unaltered by issues between plaintiff's counsel.
Also, any possible uncertainty on the part of Busch's second
counsel could have been remedied by filing the complaint within the
time limit under the first notice of claim.
filing the complaint

The time allowed for

did not expire until November

7, 1994.

Busch's second counsel had the file from at least April of 1994,
when the second notice of claim was filed.
14

Consequently, after

being retained and obtaining the file, successor counsel had at
least seven months within which to file a complaint in the time
allowed after the first notice of claim.
CONCLUSION
The district court did not have jurisdiction over Busch's
complaint because it was filed beyond the limitation period after
the filing of the first notice of claim.

The second notice of

claim did not alter the running of the statutory time period. This
Court should affirm the order dismissing Busch's complaint.
Dated this

/

day of February, 1996.

109050bc
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